7 May 1951

MESOMANDUM FOR : DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SLANS)

SURVECTI

Suggestions for Agenda of Mosting of National Psychological Strategy Goord Scheduled for 11 am, Tuesday, 8 May 1951

1. Confirming your oral request to me of 4 May 1951, I am subsitting this memoracion for your consideration prior to the National Psychological Strategy Coard meeting which is scheduled to take place in the office of the Director next thesday morning. I am setting forth in this memorandum a number of items for possible inclusion in the appeals for this secting and also a certain amount of discursion of come of these items. In the discussion I have combined my own thoughts with certain ideas of and have drawn upon a memorandum which he prepared in April 1950, at which time there was under consideration the creation of a new staff to implement the recently adopted NSC 68.

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2. Proposed agenda items:

- s. Solegtion of the frequeive Director. If no decision has been reached as to an appropriate person to held this very important post, I think there might be a discussion of names and qualifications.
- b. Discussion of appropriate staff or staffs to serve the loard. It is my own view that there should be a small highly-qualified, full-time regular staff corving union the executive Director, and in addition, a panel of consult
 on the or the vertes departments and elements primarily concerned. These concepts will be more fully discussed in a later paragraph.

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relationship of the hills and the existing (recently removed)
Prychological Operations Coordinating Frank (the degret)
Found). It should be brought out in this discussion that the
new Board is not merely a higher level psychological and
propagands werfare board but is rather a board which will
make important policy determinations and plans for all major
aspects of the cold-war situation. The functions of the new

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MPSB are readily distinguished from those of the Barnott Board, thich should continue to discharge important for tions in the field of coordinating psychological warfare contrains. In my view the Barrett Board would not be comcerned with high-level policy decisions and long-range plans but would concentrate on the wack-to-work and even the day-to-day execution of plans in the psychological warfare field.

d. There should be a discussion of the unresolved questions of policy, planning, and the provision of satisface in the economic warfare field. This is the red-headed step-united of the cold-war effort, and to my knowledge no provision has been made for obtaining resolution of policy questions and guidance to operators in the economic marfare field.

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o. Pincussion of the paymical location and quarters for ton neith. Phone will the new activity be noused. In with of the egocintment of General Smith as chairmen of the weard, there might be some disposition to suggest that the toard should be housed by CIA. Although such a conclusion would have numerous practical benefits in the sense of mixing life easier for the Director and those others within Cia who may have responsibilities in connection with the Board, it is my opinion that the Board should be set up in quarters outside of CiA and that the quarters should be commensurate in quality with the hoped-for dignity and importance of the Board. The Board will be out in the open and will be a mosting place for many kinds of people who we would prefer not to have rosming around within CIA promises, and moreover I think it would be a mistake to give the Board a too heavy CIA coloration, for many reasons.

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J. Under point b above, I make reference to the decirability of having two different kinds of "staffs." I think that a permanent staff of highly-qualified individuals is necessary if the work of the Board is to progress effectively. If the staff is composed of representatives of the various departments and spencies concerned, serving in a partation and representative especity, it could not possibly be called a staff. It would become a junior council rather than a staff and, if it should attempt to perform staff functions, it would find that it would be inhibited by its representative nature. The work of such a "attiff" would have too great a tendency toward compromises between conflicting representative interests rather than the development of general

solutions from the

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solutions from the standpoint of overall national interests. in my opinion such a group is needed in order to becautep and support the senior members of the sound and to furnish full and more continuous ligison to their respective departments and agencies, but it should be reparate from the regular staff. Such a proup of junior representatives could wall include the persons already having responsibility in the cold-war field within their respective depertments and agencies, such as Concral Hagrider and Admiral Stevens for the Department of Dofense and the MS respectively. I think the State Department should be represented by Mr. Esrrett or his deputy and in addition by a strong representative from the political side, porhaps Mr. Matthews or Mr. Perkins. I would recovered that there be an attempt to infuse some new blood into this organism by the addition of other good minds from State, Dafense, and CIA having in mind such persons as from the Department of the Army.

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The permanent full-time staff should, as stated above, be comprised of a small number of highly-qualified individuals. This staff should include experts in planning and coordinating interdepartmental operations. There sight be a program group consisting of generalists for (1) planning and policy dayslopment, (i) coordination of program implementation, and (3) continuing program roview, analysis, and reporting. In addition there might be a functional staff of apecialists for political warfare, psychological warfare, military strategy and operations, and unconventional forms of military and paramilitary activity. I would recommend the inclusion of an economic warfare epocialist within this functional staff, even though the Board may not be charged with specific responsibilities in the oconomic variars field. (The reason for this recommendation is twofold; viz, there is constant overlapping, and it has proved to be impossible to establish clear-cut distinctions between economic warfare and various other types of cold wir operations; and secondly, as a partial recordy for the unsatisfactory situation resulting from the fact that CIA (URI) has never been able to find any governmental body either capable of or willing to assume the responsibility for providing guidence in the economic unreare field.) in the namning of such a stelf, it will probably turn out that the best source of qualified personnel will be within the departments and agencies of the Government, and it may be necessary to incist on the provision of good wan from Defense, State, CiA, ebo.,

for without such

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for without such inelateroe the best individuals will not be provided and if they are not provided, the stuff will not be strong enough to support the Board.

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Assistant Director for Policy Coordination

ADPC/FOW/ab

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	PSB*		Coordination	1951
			NSC 10/2	<u> </u>
	<u> </u>		Magnitude paper	<u> </u>

IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (1) Memo from Kilbourne Johnson, DADPC to ADPC and (2) ADPC, to DDP. Subject of both: Suggestions for Agenda of Meeting of National Psychological Strategy Board Scheduled for Tuesday, 8 May 1951. [Marginal notes in ADPC's handwriting].

ABSTRACT HOTATION REFERENCES.

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Proposals for discussion problems of policy, authority,

DOCUMENT LOCATION

*Referred to in this memo as NPSB but when established actually called PSB proved For Release 2000/09/14 : CIA-RDP83-00036R001100090027-1

FORM 2523

SOURCE DOCUMENT INDEX

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